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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 06-1944
________________
JOSEPH WISE,
               Appellant
   v.
DONNA REED MILLER;
THERESA PINKETT;
JOHN COATES
___________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 05-cv-02820)
District Judge:  Honorable Edmund V. Ludwig
_______________________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
July 25, 2006
Before: SLOVITER, SMITH AND VAN ANTWERPEN, CIRCUIT JUDGES
                                          (Filed July 27, 2006)                                                   
_______________________
OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM
Joseph Wise appeals pro se from the order of the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania dismissing his civil rights complaint pursuant to
2Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) as barred by the applicable two-year statute of
limitations.
This case arises out of Wise’s attempts to procure vacant property located at 2001
West Hunting Park Avenue , for which he held no legal title.  After making about
$10,000 worth of renovations to the house, Wise moved into the property in August 2000. 
He attempted to contact the owner about buying the house but was unsuccessful.  Wise
contacted Councilwoman Miller, who in turn asked John Coates to have the City purchase
the property for Wise at a sheriff’s sale.  The first sheriff’s sale, which took place in 2001,
yielded no buyer.  Wise claims that Pinkett, an aide to Councilwoman Miller, orally
granted the property to him in 2002.  However, on January 23, 2003, a buyer, Ola
Randolph, purchased the property via a sheriff’s sale.  Wise complained to
Councilwoman Miller’s office, prompting defendant Pinkett to call the sheriff’s office. 
The sheriff’s office allegedly told Pinkett (who then told Wise) that Randolph had failed
to make a timely payment on the property and, thus, the sale would not go through and
the property would be listed on the next sheriff’s sale.  Despite Pinkett’s representations,
however, Wise received written notice of the final sale to Randolph on April 23, 2003. 
Wise’s attempts to reach Councilwoman Miller about this unforeseen turn of events went
unanswered.  On May 23, 2003, Wise received an eviction notice from Randolph, in
connection with the eviction process brought against Wise in the Philadelphia County
Court of Common Pleas.  On September 4, 2003, the Common Pleas Court entered a
default judgment against Wise.  Wise did not prevail on appeal.  After receiving  many
3notices to vacate the premises or pay rent to Randolph, Wise moved out of the property
on July 8, 2004.
On June 14, 2005, Wise filed a civil rights complaint seeking damages against
defendants Miller, Pinkett, and Coates, alleging that they were obligated to purchase the
property on his behalf.  He claimed that by their failure to purchase the property for him,
the defendants effectively denied him his right to the property without due process of law,
deprived him of a liberty interest without due process of law, and subjected him to cruel
and unusual punishment, in violation of the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments.
The Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) as
barred by the statute of limitations and because Wise failed to identify a cognizable
property interest.  The District Court granted the motion, holding that the complaint was
time-barred.  The District Court rejected Wise’s argument that the limitations period
accrued on July 8, 2004, when he was forced to vacate the property.  The District Court
determined that the injury for which Wise sought relief was the defendants’ failure to
purchase the property for him.  Thus, the District Court reasoned, the injury occurred on
January 23, 2003, the date that the property was sold to Randolph.  The District Court
ruled that Wise became aware of his injury, at the latest, on April 23, 2003, the date he
received written notice that the property had been sold Randolph.  Wise had two years, or
until April 23, 2005, to file a timely complaint.  Based on the April accrual date, the
District Court held that the complaint, filed on June 14, 2005, was time-barred.  The
District Court dismissed the complaint with prejudice.  Wise filed a timely appeal.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of the District
Court’s dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is plenary.  Gallo v. City of
Philadelphia, 161 F.3d 217, 221 (3rd Cir. 1998).  We accept as true all factual allegations
in the complaint and will affirm a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) only if it is certain that
no relief can be granted under any set of facts which could be proved.  Steamfitters Local
Union No. 420 Welfare Fund v. Phillip Morris Inc., et al., 171 F.3d 912, 919 (3rd Cir.
1999).
We will affirm for the reasons set forth by the District Court in its opinion. 
However unfortunate it may be that Wise was unable to obtain ownership of the property
in which he invested considerable “sweat equity,” nothing can change the fact that he
filed his civil rights complaint almost two months after the two-year limitations period
had expired.  The complaint is time-barred.
We have thoroughly reviewed the remaining arguments Wise makes on appeal and
find them meritless.  Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
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